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MAD MEN AND DEAD MEN: JUSTIFICATION FOR
REGULATION OF COMPUTER-GENERATED
IMAGES OF DECEASED CELEBRITY ENDORSERS
KERRY BARRETT*
ABSTRACT
Pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) is charged with consumer protection through the prohibition of unfair and
deceptive trade practices. An unfair and deceptive trade practice is gaining in
prominence and has not yet been subjected to FTC regulation. Computer-Generated
Images (“CGIs”) of deceased celebrity endorsers are misleading to consumers and
constitute a false advertisement. This Note evaluates how digitally resurrected
endorsers pervert the consumer decision-making process through analysis of issuerelevant thinking, the match-up hypothesis, event-study analysis, social adaptation
theory, and transfer theory. This Note also accounts for the macroeconomic effect of
regulation of CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers. In order to fulfill its
constitutionally mandated duty of protecting consumers, the FTC should issue an allout ban on CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Forty years after his death, a computer-generated image (“CGI”)1 of Bruce Lee
has digitally resurrected him to endorse Johnnie Walker Blue Label Scotch. 2 The
director of the ad, Joseph Kahn, stated, “We wanted to be as respectful to the man
and legend as we could.”3 Kahn must have overlooked that Lee spent his life
practicing teetotalism.4 Noted Hong Kong filmmaker, Edwin Lee, described the
advertisement as
eerily real-life and [looks like] Bruce Lee. But to attribute all that talent so
you can sell alcohol? I find it disgraceful. The man even abstained from
alcohol . . . The fact that he is “revived” in such vivid manner to promote
a product [and] lifestyle he never conformed to nor has a choice in this

1

Computer generated images of the kind used in advertising allow for user interaction,
meaning that the program, whether general or special purpose, allows the creator to be in
control of the eventual output, usually through the use of electronic stylus or mouse. See
Marilyn Galvin Stewart, The Computer-Generated Image: An Analysis for Art Education
Pedagogy (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University) (on file with
The Ohio State University). The movement of the mouse or stylus is converted into digital
values for the computer. Id. The values relate to the Cartesian Coordinate System (CSS) that is
used to plot a point specified with respect to two intersecting lines, the horizontal x-axis and
the vertical y-axis. Id. For three-dimensional images, the conceptualization of space takes on a
third axis, the z-axis, which accounts for depth. Id. Television screens, here the output device,
are divided into picture elements (pixels). Id. Pixels are the smallest addressable screen
element and the larger the number of pixels the higher the resolution of the generated image.
Id. With high-resolution images, these pixels appear smooth to the naked eye. Id. Movement
of the image appears when the program orders the computer to display one image and then
another in rapid succession. Id.
2 Dorothy Pomerantz, Bruce Lee is Back, FORBES, Oct. 23, 2013; see also Navin Katyal,
The Unauthorized Dissemination of Celebrity Images on the Internet . . . In the Flesh, 46
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 739, 747-49 (1998) (discussing the ownership rights of celebrity images).
3 Jeremy Blum, Bruce Lee Whisky Advert Branded a Disgrace, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 10, 2013.
4

Id.
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matter is, I feel, immoral and shows you the lowest depravity of mass
marketing these days.5
Neither the use of celebrity endorsements nor the practice of consumer deception is
new to the advertising industry.6 The use of celebrities in advertisements reliably
results in more favorable ratings amongst consumers as compared to ad campaigns
that do not use celebrity endorsers.7 Approximately 20% of television commercials
feature a celebrity endorsement. 8 However, the use of celebrity endorsements and the
practice of consumer deception are increasingly intertwined as CGI technology is
deployed by advertising companies to digitally resurrect celebrities to endorse
products, thereby deceiving consumers.
While there is continued use of traditional celebrity endorsements, CGIs are
gaining prominence, as there are numerous benefits of using deceased celebrities to
endorse products.9 One normative issue with celebrity endorsements is the associated
cost, and CGI technology ameliorates that issue.10 For example, rights to the
deceased James Dean’s image can be purchased for $15,000, whereas the living
David Beckham’s endorsement of Gillette razors cost the company over $35
million.11 Celebrity endorsement advertisements are being used more frequently, and
the amount paid to celebrity endorsers is likewise increasing. 12 Ten percent of funds
used for television advertisements go to celebrity endorsement contracts. 13 In fact,
5

Id.

6 For the purposes of this Note, “endorser” will be defined as “any individual who enjoys
public recognition and who uses this recognition on behalf of a consumer good by appearing
with it in an advertisement.” See McCracken, infra note 125. In addition, for the purposes of
this Note, “celebrity” will be defined as “an individual who is known to the public (actor,
sports figure, entertainer, etc.) for his or her achievements in areas other than that of the
product class endorsed.” See Hershey Friedman & Linda Friedman, Endorser Effectiveness by
Product Type, 19 J. ADVERT. RES. 63, 63 (1979).
7 Charles Adkin & Martin Block, Effectiveness of Celebrity Endorsers, 23 J. CONSUMER
RES. 57, 57-61 (1983).
8 See infra notes 76-98 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of and the
basis for industry utilization of celebrity endorsements).
9

For example, deceased celebrities are highly unlikely to cause a new scandal that
results in consumer backlash against the company. See generally Laura Stampler, The 13
Worst Celebrity Endorsement Fails, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 31, 2012),
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-13-worst-celebrity-endorsement-fails-2012-1?op=1.
10

KATHERINE T. FRITH & BARBARA MUELLER, ADVERTISING
ISSUES (2003).

AND

SOCIETIES I: GLOBAL

11 Jacob Davidson, Digital Necromancy: Advertising with Reanimated Celebrities, TIME,
Aug. 02, 2013. £30,000,000 was converted to $38,314,176, using the 2013 U.S. Dollars to
Euro zone Euros exchange rate, which was 0.783. See Yearly Average Currency Exchange
Rates
Translating
Foreign
Currency
into
U.S.
Dollars,
IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Yearly-Average-Currency-ExchangeRates.
12

Randall Lane, The Forbes All-Stars, FORBES, Dec. 19, 1994, at 266-78.

13

Stratford P. Sherman, When You Wish Upon a Star, FORTUNE MAG., Aug. 19, 1985, at
68 (“Roughly 10% of the ad dollars spent on TV now go for celebrity ads.”).
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many celebrities will earn more in advertising deals than in the field which gave rise
to their fame.14 The advertising industry uses celebrity endorsements to draw
attention to the endorsed product and to add value to the product by transferring the
consumer’s positive attitude of the celebrity onto the product.15
The magnitude and impact of advertising has reached historical highs. 16 The
United States is the global leader in per capita advertising expenditures spending at
$534.80.17 Advertisements communicate decisive information to consumers
regarding a product’s price, quality, and availability. 18 City-dwelling Americans may
see as many as 5,000 advertisements per day. 19 Consumers treat advertisements as
shortcut decision makers, as few have the time or inclination to fully develop their
knowledge as to all product alternatives.20 Therefore, preventing the proliferation of
deceptive advertisements is necessary to protecting consumers and guarding against
unfair trade practices.
Due to the prominence of celebrity endorsements and CGIs in advertising, the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) must take action to guard
against such consumer deception. Lee’s computer-generated endorsement of Johnnie
Walker Blue Label Scotch is but one of the deceptive trade practices against which
the FTC aims to protect.21 Where representations in advertising have the capacity or
14

Id.

15

Researchers have found several justifications for advertisers’ use of celebrity endorsers:

The modern corporation invests significant amounts of money to align itself and its
products with big-name celebrities in the belief that they will (a) draw attention to the
endorsed products/services and (b) transfer image values to these products/services by
virtue of their celebrity profile and engaging attributes . . . Marketing has sought to
use the varied meanings personified by celebrities to assist the achievement of specific
communication objectives. Underpinning the usage of celebrities in a communications
context is the belief that the profile and attributes of the celebrity both draw attention
to the messages they deliver and, through a rub-off effect, transfer image values to
those messages.
Sheila O’Mahony & Tony Meenaghan The Impact of Celebrity Endorsements on Consumers,
10 IRISH MARKETING REV. no. 21997, 1998, at 15.
16 Walter D. Scott, The Psychology of Advertising, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 1904),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1904/01/the-psychology-of-advertising/303465.
17

FRITH & MUELLER, supra note 10.

18

John Hood, In Praise of Advertising, CONSUMER’S RES. MAG., Apr. 1, 1998.

19

Louise Story, Anywhere the Eye Can See, It’s Likely to See an Ad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,

2007.
20

Hood, supra note 18.

21 In 2012, Marilyn Monroe starred in a Dior Perfume Commercial alongside Charlize
Theron, Grace Kelly, and Marlene Dietrich. Monroe was famously a Chanel No. 5 girl, Dior’s
biggest competitor. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2017); 50 Years After Her Death, Marilyn
Monroe is the Face of Chanel’s Sexy New Ad Campaign, DIGITAL SYNOPSIS,
https://digitalsynopsis.com/advertising/50-years-after-her-death-marilyn-monroe-is-the-faceof-chanels-sexy-new-ad-campaign/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2017); Nicole Tyrimou, The Battle of
the Fragrance Titans—J’Adore Dior Vs. Chanel No. 5, EUROMONITOR INT’L (Aug. 3, 2014),
http://blog.euromonitor.com/2014/08/the-battle-of-the-fragrance-titans-j-adore-dior-vs-chanelno-5.html; Chris Eggersten, Charlize Theron Stars Alongside CGI Versions of Marilyn
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tendency to deceive consumers, the FTC has the duty to regulate them. 22 While not
yet regulated, the use of CGIs of deceased celebrities endorsers in advertising is a
deceptive trade practice subject to the Commission’s regulation. In order to fulfill its
congressionally-mandated duty of protecting consumers,23 the FTC should issue an
all-out ban on computer-generated images of deceased celebrity endorsers.
Section II of this Note explores potential First Amendment protected speech
issues with regard to promulgating regulation within this sector. Section III explains
the requirements the FTC must meet in regulating deceptive trade practices,
including advertising endorsements. Section IV proposes a Statement of Basis and
Purpose for the FTC to consider in promulgating a regulation. Section V proposes
the Final Regulatory Analysis the FTC would be required to conduct. Finally,
Section VI concludes by proffering that because advertisements using CGIs
constitute a deceptive trade practice not protected by the First Amendment, the FTC
must promulgate regulation.
II. TENSION BETWEEN FTC REGULATION AND FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. CGIs of Deceased Celebrity Endorsers Constitute Commercial Speech
The first test the Supreme Court used to define “commercial speech” was the
primary purpose test, where speech was deemed “commercial” if sales were the
“primary purpose” of the speech.24 The Court has since moved away from the
“primary purpose” test.25 In 1973, the Court in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Com. on Human Relations defined “commercial speech” as speech which does “no
more than propose a commercial transaction.” 26 The Court has since sought to define
“commercial speech” through the application of a three-factor test.27 The three
factors, as stated in Bolger v. Youngs, are:
Monroe, Grace Kelly, Marlene Dietrich in New Dior Commercial: The Second Post-Mortem
Appearance by Monroe in a Perfume Ad (Sept. 6, 2011), http://uproxx.com/hitﬁx/charlizetheron-mingles-with-the-ghosts-of-marilyn-monroe-grace-kelly-marlene-dietrich-in-new-diorad/.
22

Courts have commented on honoring the spirit of FTC Act:

In order best to implement the prophylactic purpose of the statute, it has been
consistently held that advertising falls within its proscription not only when there is
proof of actual deception but also when representations made have a capacity or
tendency to deceive, i.e., when there is a likelihood or fair probability that the reader
will be misled.
FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58.
23

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58.

24

Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 52 (1942).

25

Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Com. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973).
26 Id. (“The critical feature of the advertisement in Valentine v. Chrestensen was that, in
the Court’s view, it did no more than propose a commercial transaction, the sale of admission
to a submarine.”); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
27 See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983) (“The mere fact
that these pamphlets are conceded to be advertisements clearly does not compel the
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(1) Whether the speech in question is concededly an advertisement;
(2) Whether it makes reference to a specific product;
(3) Whether it is motivated by economic interest. 28
The Supreme Court also clarified that a finding of just one of the factors does not
make the speech commercial; rather, it is “the combination of all these
characteristics [that] provides strong support for the conclusion that the speech in
question can be properly characterized as commercial speech.”29 Though the Court
has endeavored to refine the definition of commercial speech in these ways, it has
not abandoned the notion that determining whether speech is commercial is a matter
of common sense.30
B. Constitutional Protection Afforded to Commercial Speech under the First
Amendment
The First Amendment states, in part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech.”31 The Supreme Court originally held that if speech was
commercial, it lost all constitutional protection under the First Amendment. 32 The
Supreme Court later struck down this precedent, making clear that commercial
speech is afforded some degree of First Amendment protection. 33 In 1980, hearing
conclusion that they are commercial speech. Similarly, the reference to a specific product does
not by itself render the pamphlets commercial speech. Finally, the fact that Youngs has an
economic motivation for mailing the pamphlets would clearly be insufficient by itself to turn
the materials into commercial speech.”) (citations omitted).
28

Id.

29

Id. (emphasis in original).

30

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978) (“We have not discarded
the ‘common-sense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of
speech.”).
31

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

32

The protection of the “marketplace of ideas” was originally thought not to encompass
commercial speech, regardless of whether or not the speech was deceptive:
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of
the freedom of communicating information and dissemination opinion and that,
though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the
public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these
public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising.
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
33 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455 (“Expression concerning purely commercial transactions has
come within the ambit of the Amendment’s protection only recently. In rejecting the notion
that such speech ‘is wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment,’ we were careful
not to hold ‘that it is wholly undifferentiable [sic] from other forms’ of speech.”) (quoting
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761, 771 n.24 (1976)).
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Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, the Court developed a
four-part test to determine whether commercial speech is afforded constitutional
protection under the First Amendment. 34 For commercial speech to fall within the
ambit of the First Amendment, the Central Hudson Court stated:
(1) It at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. (2)
Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If
both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine (3) whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and (4)
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 35
Central Hudson goes on to make plain that speech’s failure to satisfy the first part of
the test, meaning it either concerns unlawful activity or is misleading, is left without
First Amendment protection, as
[t]he First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the
informational function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no
constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that
do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than
to inform it, or commercial speech related to illegal activity. If the
communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful inactivity,
the government’s power is more circumscribed.36
C. Despite Being Commercial Speech, CGIs of Deceased Celebrity Endorsers are
not Entitled to First Amendment Protection
CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers satisfy the Bolger three-factor test to be
considered commercial speech.37 However, they do not satisfy the Central Hudson
four-part test for commercial speech to be afforded constitutional protection under
the First Amendment because they are misleading. For example, the Johnnie Walker
34 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
It is worth noting that this case defined “commercial speech” as an “expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Id. at 561.
35

Id.

36

Id. at 563-64 (citations omitted).

37

The dichotomy between commercial speech and non-commercial speech has been
continuously eroded such that some legal scholars argue that the two forms of speech are
indistinguishable:
One obvious logical problem in distinguishing commercial speech from political
expression is the simple fact that inherent in every speech labeled as ‘commercial’ is
at least some noncommercial message: the expression of ideas and values such as
materialism or capitalism. There is no such thing as ‘pure’ commercial speech.
Certainly, the First Amendment, and the marketplace of ideas, makes no obvious
distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech, and the difficulty of the
Court over the years in defining commercial speech at least suggests that the
distinction does not really exist.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1357 (8th ed. 2010)
(footnote
omitted).
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ad is concededly an advertisement that makes reference to a specific product, and it
is motivated by economic interest. However, the ad fails the first part of the Central
Hudson four-part test in that while it concerns lawful activity, it is misleading due to
the digital resurrection of the celebrity endorser. Therefore, CGIs of deceased
celebrity endorsers are engaging in advertising is outside the ambit of First
Amendment protection.
Given the artistic undertaking necessary to produce a lifelike CGI, some may
argue that CGIs of deceased celebrities are expressive and not purely commercial
speech—and that they are therefore entitled to a greater degree of First Amendment
protection.38 However, the Supreme Court has stated that the inclusion of protected
speech is not sufficient to immunize commercial speech from government
regulation.39 Thus, even if one were to accept the argument that the creation of CGIs
is artistic, rendering the speech expressive, that would not prevent their use in
endorsements from Commission regulation.40 As mentioned previously, the Supreme
Court has held that misleading or deceptive commercial speech is left without First
Amendment protection.41

38

Some argue CGIs are arguably artistic and expressive speech:

Like all true artwork, these stunning images are the product of talent, training, vision,
hard work, and exceptional technical and artistic skill. In the hands of a trained artist,
the computer can become a tool for expressing artistic vision, every bit as much as a
paintbrush or chisel. One must recognize that the creation of successful art does not lie
solely in the moment of inspiration, but also in the painstaking attention to detail and
the millions of crucial decisions along the path to the realization of the finished piece.
Just as a master painter conveys his or her unique vision through the application of
color, the direction and length of brushstrokes, and the inclusion or omission of detail,
the computer artist manipulates the myriad of variables in the software to create
compelling images.
PETER WEISHAR, CGI: THE ART OF THE 3D COMPUTER-GENERATED IMAGE 11 (2004). Though
it could also be argued that CGIs of deceased celebrities are inherently derivative as the goal
to reproduce the original as nearly as possible. Therefore, the CGI should not be entitled to
First Amendment protection. See, e.g., Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21
P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
39

See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942) (“[T]he affixing of the protest
against official conduct to the advertising circular was with the intent, and for the purpose, of
evading the prohibition of the ordinance. If that evasion were successful, every merchant who
desires to broadcast advertising leaflets in the streets need only append a civic appeal, or
moral platitude, to achieve immunity from the law’s command.”).
40 The Supreme Court has held that commercial speech embedded in expressive speech is
subject to regulation so long as it is not “inextricably intertwined” with expressive speech by a
“law of man or of nature.” Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
474 (1989) (quotation marks omitted).
41 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 563-64; Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (“Untruthful
speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”).
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III. ADVERTISING IN THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT: THE ROLE OF THE FTC IN
REGULATING DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
The Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which Congress passed under
the authority granted in the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, gives the
FTC the power to prohibit unfair practices and declares that “unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
affecting commerce,” are unlawful. 42 This portion of the Act was amended vis-à-vis
the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938—which amended the original language from “unfair
methods of competition in commerce” to “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce” and thereby extended the FTC’s authority to protect consumers as
opposed to only business competitors. 43 The use of CGIs of deceased celebrity
endorsers a product constitutes a false advertisement, and the dissemination of false
advertisements is an “unfair or deceptive act or practice.”44
A. Defining “Unfair or Deceptive Act or Practice”
“Unfair” and “deceptive” are not defined within the FTC Act; rather, the
statutory interpretation of such words has been left to the Commission. 45 “Unfair”
and “deceptive” are legal terms of art that are independent from one another. 46
Therefore, an advertisement can be unfair, deceptive, neither, or both. An “unfair”
act or practice has been defined by the Commission as one that:
(1) Causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers,
(2) Cannot be reasonably avoided by consumers,
(3) Is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.47
A “deceptive” act or practice is one that is:
(1) A representation, omission, or practice that misleads or is likely to
mislead the consumer,

42 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”).
43

Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 45-57).
44 15 U.S.C. § 52(b) (“The dissemination or the causing to be disseminated of any false
advertisement . . . shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce”).
45 See Civil Justice Reform, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729 (Feb. 5, 1996); see, e.g., United States v.
Boisdoré’s Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850); Carlos J. Cuevas, The Rehnquist Court, Strict
Statutory Construction and the Bankruptcy Code, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 435, 437 (1994).
46 See
FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, FTC (Dec. 17,
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness.
47

1980),

See id.
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(2) A consumer’s interpretation of the representation, omission, or
practice is considered reasonable under the circumstances,
(3) The misleading representation, omission, or practice is material. 48
As noted above, we need not determine whether false advertising is itself an unfair
or deceptive act or practice, as Congress has already determined that it is. 49
B. Defining “False Advertising”
“False advertising” has been statutorily defined by Congress as “an advertisement,
other than labeling, which is misleading in a material respect,” meaning that the
misrepresentation is “likely to affect a consumer’s conduct or decision with regard to a
product or service.”50 Advertisements need not actually mislead or deceive to be subject
to FTC regulation, as representations that merely have the capacity to deceive are
unlawful.51 Further, advertisements, which might carry multiple meanings, are false if
one of those meanings creates a misleading impression.52 Advertisements are “false” not
only if they affirmatively make misrepresentations, but also if they fail to make
representations with regard to material facts of the advertisement.53 When determining
whether false advertising exists, one must evaluate the net impression that the
advertisement leaves on the consumer.54 However, an advertisement does not become
deceptive merely if a minority of consumers unreasonably misunderstands its meaning.55
48 FTC Policy Statement on Deception, FTC (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/publicstatements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception.
49

See 15 U.S.C. § 52(b).

50

FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 48; 15 U.S.C. §55(a)(1).

51

See Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2nd Cir. 1944) (“That
the Commission did not produce consumers to testify to their deception does not make the
order improper, since actual deception of the public need not be shown . . . Representations
merely having a ‘capacity to deceive’ are unlawful.”) (citations omitted).
52 See Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1953) (“The important
question to be resolved is the impression given by an advertisement as a whole.
Advertisements which are capable of two meanings, one of which is false, are misleading. . . .
Advertisements which create a false impression, although literally true, may be prohibited.”)
(citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 384 U.S. 940 (1955).
53

See 15 U.S.C. §55(a)(1).

54

Because the purpose of the FTC act is both to ensure fair market competition and
protect consumers, the determination of whether deception exists must be made from the point
of view of the ordinary consumer,
That law was not ‘made for the protection of experts, but for the public – that vast
multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous . . . and the
‘fact that a false statement may be obviously false to those who are trained and
experienced does not change its character, nor take away its power to deceive others
less experienced . . . The important criterion is the net impression which the
advertisement is likely to make upon the general populace.
Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp., 143 F.2d at 679 (citation omitted).
55 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 48 (“A representation does not
become ‘false and deceptive’ merely because it will be unreasonably misunderstood by an
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C. Defining “Endorsement”
CGIs of decreased celebrity endorsers constitute “celebrity endorsements” under
the FTC construction of “endorsement” within the Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, a non-binding guidance document.56
This FTC industry guide on endorsements and testimonials in advertising defines an
“endorsement” as
any advertising message (including verbal statements, demonstrations, or
depictions of the name, signature, likeness or other identifying personal
characteristics of an individual or the name or seal of an organization) that
consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings or
experiences of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser, even if the
views expressed by that party are identical to those of the sponsoring
advertiser.57
An advertisement constitutes an endorsement if “a significant percentage of
consumers are likely to believe the celebrity’s statements represent his own views
even though he is reading from a script.”58 Therefore, under this definition,
“endorsements” can include explicit, implicit, imperative, or co-present
endorsements.59 Explicit endorsements involve the endorser expressly telling the
consumer that he or she is endorsing the product, whereas implicit endorsements
merely convey that the endorser uses the product. 60 In imperative endorsements, the
endorser is directing them to use the product. In co-present endorsements, the
endorser appears alongside or interacts with the product. 61 Further, the FTC has
stated that “endorsements must reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs, or
experiences of the endorser.”62 Clearly, Kahn’s Johnnie Walker Blue Label Scotch
commercial featuring Bruce Lee falls short of this requirement.
In fact, all CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers fall short of the FTC standards
for endorsements. The Commission has stated,
[W]hen the advertisement represents that the endorser uses the endorsed
product, the endorser must have been a bona fide user of it at the time the
insignificant and unrepresentative segment of the class of persons to whom the representation
is addressed.”) (quoting In re Heinz W. Kirchner Trading as Universe Co., 63 F.T.C. 1282,
1290 (1963)).
56

5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2017) (explaining that guidance documents are expressly exempted
from the requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking so as to give the guidance
documents the force of law); 16 C.F.R. § 225.0(a) (2009).
57

16 C.F.R. § 255.0(b).

58 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(c) (“Example 4: . . . A significant percentage of consumers are
likely to believe the celebrity’s statements represent his own views even though he is reading
from a script. The celebrity is subject to liability for his statement about the product. The
advertiser is also liable for misrepresentations made through the endorsement.”).
59

See McCracken, infra note 125, at 310.

60

See id.

61

16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a).

62

Id.
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endorsement was given. Additionally, the advertiser may continue to run
the advertisement only so long as it has a good reason to believe that the
endorser remains a bona fide user of the product.63
Given that these celebrities are being digitally resurrected, it is a factual
impossibility that they are bona fide users of the product at the time the endorsement
is given.64 Not only was Bruce Lee never a bona fide user of Johnnie Walker Scotch
during his life, but he certainly was not a bona fide user forty years after his death.
D. FTC Procedure for Regulating Unfair Trade Practices
The FTC is empowered to regulate unfair or deceptive trade practices through
administrative rules.65 “For purposes of carrying out the provisions of the statutes
administered by it, the Commission is empowered to promulgate rules and
regulations applicable to unlawful trade practices.”66 It could be argued that, rather
than promulgating a new rule, the FTC might instead clarify in the Guides
Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising that CGIs fall
within the existing rules” The purpose of this non-binding industry guide is to clarify
Commission rules so as to give the regulated industry the ability to comply. 67 The
industry guides provide definitions and examples of what the FTC would consider

63

16 C.F.R. § 255.1(c) (emphasis added).

64

Bruce Lee does not stand alone as the only CGI celebrity endorser who cannot possibly
be a bona fide user of the product at the time the endorsement was given:
While Elton John might have opted to hawk Diet Coke just for the taste of it, the three
late film stars who appear with him in a new high-tech TV commercial—Humphrey
Bogart, James Cagney and Louis Armstrong—had no choice in the matter . . . In the
Diet Coke commercial, John appears to be playing piano in a nightclub while Bogart,
Cagney and Armstrong pop in for cameo appearances. Armstrong blows a trumpet riff
from a Diet Coke jingle as he stands next to the British pop star’s piano, and Bogart
walks into the nightclub as though he is actually Rick Blaine, walking into his own
club in downtown Casablanca. Cagney not only places an order for drinks but also
appears to smile at his modern lady companion as she rests her elbow on his shoulder.
Dennis McDougal, Not Quite the Real Thing: Old Movie Clips Used in Commercials Leave a
Bad Taste in Filmmaker’s Mouths, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991.
Marketers, eager to latch onto a fresh approach that has proven it can work, have
appropriated the dead as pitchmen . . .Recent examples include Fred Astaire dancing
with a Dirt Devil vacuum . . . [S]ome complain that exploiting the dead to enrich their
heirs also denigrates our culture. Fred Astaire’s widow approved the Dirt Devil spot,
but his daughter Ava called them the antithesis of everything her father represented.
Ad Strategies Seeking to Raise the Dead, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 08, 1997.
65 See 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2017) (“[T]he term ‘rule’ means any rule for which the agency
publishes a general notice of proposed rulemaking”); 16 C.F.R. § 1.14(a) (“The Commission,
after review of the rulemaking record, may issue, modify, or decline to issue any rule . . . If it
determines not to issue a rule, it may adopt and publish an explanation for not doing so.”).
66

16 C.F.R. § 1.22(a).

67

16 C.F.R. § 255.
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endorsements.68 The FTC reviews industry guides on an approximate ten-year
schedule to ensure that the Commission’s rules remain relevant and not unduly
burdensome.69 The Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising was most recently reviewed in October 2009 and is scheduled for review
in 2020.70
However, this approach has its drawbacks. Altering the existing guide, while
procedurally efficient, opens the door for the advertising industry to claim that the
FTC is attempting to promulgate a new, substantive rule through a non-binding

68 See id. (“Example 4: A manufacturer of automobile tires hires a well-known
professional automobile racing driver to deliver its advertising message in television
commercials. In these commercials, the driver speaks of the smooth ride, strength, and long
life of the tires. Even though the message is not expressly declared to be the personal opinion
of the driver, it may nevertheless constitute an endorsement of the tires. Many consumers will
recognize this individual as being primarily a racing driver and not merely a spokesperson or
announcer of advertiser. Accordingly, they may well believe the driver would not speak for an
automotive product unless he actually believed in what he was saying and had personal
knowledge sufficient to form that belief. Hence, they would think that the advertising message
reflects the driver’s personal views. This attribution of the underlying views to the driver
brings the advertisement within the definition of an endorsement for purposes of this part.”);
see also id. (“Example 5: A television advertisement for a particular brand of golf balls shows
a prominent and well-recognized golfer practicing numerous drives off the tee. This would be
an endorsement by the golfer even though she makes no verbal statement in the
advertisement.”).
69
Federal Trade Commission Regulatory Review Plan: Ensuring FTC Rules Are Up-toDate,
Effective,
and
Not
Overly
Burdensome,
FTC,
https://www.ftc.gov.sites/default/files/documents/one-stops/regulatoryreview/regreviewplan.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2017) (“[I]t is important to systematically
review regulations to ensure that they continue to achieve their intended goals without unduly
burdening commerce . . . The FTC schedules its regulations and guides for review on a tenyear cycle; i.e., all rules an guides are scheduled to be reviewed ten years after
implementation”).
70

See 16 C.F.R. § 255; FTC Publishes Guides Governing Endorsements, Testimonials:
Changes Affect Testimonial Advertisements, Bloggers, Celebrity Endorsements, FTC,
https://www.ftc.gov/press-releases/2009/10/ftc-publishes-final-guides-governingendorsements-testimonials (last visited Mar. 27, 2017); Notice Announcing Ten-Year
Regulatory Review Schedule and Request for Public Comment on the Federal Trade
Commission’s
Regulatory
Review
Program
15,
FTC,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/one-stops/regulatoryreview/regreviewfrn.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Ten-Year Regulatory
Review]. The review in 2009 changed the guides to demonstrate that not only is the advertiser
liable for false advertising, but so is the celebrity endorser. The estate of the CGI celebrities
would therefore be liable for the inherently deceptive commercial use of the CGI
representations. In this way, FTC regulation can protect deceased celebrities in ways that other
legal recourses have failed, such as the right of publicity. See generally Shannon Flynn Smith,
If It Looks Like Tupac, Walks Like Tupac, and Raps Like Tupac, It’s Probably Tupac: Virtual
Cloning and Postmortem Right-of-Publicity Implications, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1719
(2013); Joseph J. Beard, Clones, Bones, and Twilight Zones: Protecting the Digital Persona of
the Quick, the Dead, and the Imaginary, 16 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 1165, 1165 (2001).
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guidance document.71 Therefore, the FTC should promulgate a new, substantive rule
regarding CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers and incorporate that rule as an
example in the revised industry guide scheduled for 2020.
When the FTC decides to promulgate a rule, it must adopt a Statement of Basis
and Purpose and issue a Final Regulatory Analysis. 72 A Statement of Basis and
Purpose includes:
(1) A statement as to the prevalence of the acts or practices treated by the
rule;
(2) A statement as to the manner and context in which such acts or
practices are unfair or deceptive;
(3) A statement as to the economic effect of the rule, taking into account
the effect on small businesses and consumers;
(4) A statement as to the effect of the rule on state and local laws; and
(5) A statement of the manner in which the public may obtain copies of
the final regulatory analysis.73
The Final Regulatory Analysis includes:
(1) A concise statement of the need for, and the objective of, the final
rule;
(2) A description of any alternatives to the final rule which were
considered by the Commission;
(3) An analysis of the projected benefits and any adverse economic
effects and any other effects of the rule;
(4) An explanation of the reasons for the determination of the
Commission that the final rule will attain its objectives in a manner
consistent with applicable law and the reasons the particular
alternative was chosen;
(5) A summary of any significant issues raised by the comments
submitted during the public comment in response to the preliminary
regulatory analysis; and
(6) The information required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.
601-612, and the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501-3520, if
applicable.74
71

See, e.g., 53 Fed. Reg 19281 (1988), which was struck down as it imposed substantive
obligations on regulated industries outside formal adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking.
72

See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.14(a)(1)(i-v)-(2)(i-vi).

73

16 C.F.R. § 1.14(a)(1)(i-v).
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While the FTC is required to analyze each factor above when promulgating its final
rule, only some of the factors will be dispositive of the Commission’s decision to
regulate CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers.
IV. FTC REGULATION: STATEMENT OF BASIS AND PURPOSE
The most salient of the factors for determining regulation are: (1) the statement
as to the prevalence of the acts or practices treated by the rule, (2) the statement as to
the manner and context in which such acts or practices are unfair or deceptive, and
(3) the statement as to the economic effect of the rule taking into account the effect
on small businesses and consumers.
A. Statement as to the Prevalence of the Acts or Practices Treated by the Rule
The advertising industry uses celebrity endorsements of products or services
because consumers find the endorsements attention-grabbing, likeable, and
impactful.75 To explain the prevalence of celebrity endorsements, scholars have
researched the ways in which celebrity endorsements are an effective advertising
strategy.76
A 1994 study evaluated the effect of non-substantive product features, such as
spokesperson fame, when consumers are engaged in issue-relevant thinking in both
competitive and non-competitive settings.77 Issue-relevant thinking refers to the
focus a consumer allocates to a particular purchase decision. 78 Issue-relevant
thinking generally functions to drive down the import of non-substantive features;
however, effects such as competition and neutralization function to increase the
influence of non-substantive features.79 Neutralization occurs when differences
across and among products are counterbalanced and, thus, irrelevant in purchasing
decisions.80 For example, if a consumer espoused the belief that pair of jeans X was
more comfortable but less stylish than pair of jeans Y, and the consumer valued the
jeans equally due to that trade-off, neutralization will have occurred as to the jeans’
comfort and style.
In this study, researchers found that even when consumers engaged in issue
relevant thinking, spokesperson fame had an effect in competitive markets where
products were homogenous or featured cross-alternative trade-offs.81 Neutralization
74

16 C.F.R. § 1.14(a)(2)(i-vi).

75 See O’Mahony & Meenaghan, supra note 15, at 18 (“Respondents were most in
agreement with the statement that celebrity endorsements were attention-grabbing. Celebrity
endorsements were also perceived to be entertaining, likeable, and impactful.”).
76 See generally id.; Kahle & Homer, infra note 99; Timothy B. Heath et al.,
Spokesperson Fame and Vividness Effects in the Context of Issue-Relevant Thinking: The
Moderating role of Competitive Setting, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 520-34 (1994); McCracken,
infra note 125.
77 See Heath et al., supra note 76. Issue relevant thinking is conceptually similar to
instances of high involvement conditions as evaluated in Kahle & Homer, infra note 99.
78

See Heath et al., supra note 76, at 520.

79

Id. at 530.

80

Id. at 521.

81

Id. at 530.
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and competition function to drive down the efficacy of substantive product features,
thereby increasing the efficacy of non-substantive features on consumer purchasing
attitudes and decisions.82 In this way, famous spokespersons, or celebrity endorsers,
function as heuristic tiebreakers, or allow consumers to make purchasing decisions
based on nonepistemic considerations.83 For example, it is likely that a celebrity
endorser would be less efficacious in getting consumers to switch from Band-Aid to
another adhesive bandage company as opposed to getting consumers to switch from
Pepsi to Coca-Cola, as the latter scenario is typified by a competitive market
featuring neutralized, homogenous products. When products are similar, celebrity
endorsements have a greater impact.84
A 1995 study found that investors place positive economic value on celebrity
endorsements in advertising despite the escalating cost of such contracts. 85 The study
shifted the focus away from the effects of celebrity endorsements on consumer
attitudes to emphasize the economic impact of a celebrity endorser using an eventstudy analysis.86 Market analysts use announcements of celebrity endorsement
contracts to predict a publicly-traded company’s potential return on its advertising
investment as offset by the considerable cost. 87 Determining the economic efficacy
of the celebrity endorser is complicated by the multitude of factors that comprise a
consumer’s purchasing decisions.88 Therefore, the study posits that one should be
able to evaluate the profitability of celebrity endorsements through the abnormal
returns a company will experience due to the market analysts’ predictions on
potential future return.89 This event study evaluated the price of a security (which
reflects the present value of a company’s future assets, presumably taking into
account all available information on the company) both prior and subsequent to the
announcement of a celebrity endorsement contract.90 The difference in the preannouncement value of the security from the post-announcement value is, therefore,
taken to be a dependable gauge of the market’s economic value attributed to
celebrity endorsements.91 At the very least, the difference in the security value ought
to represent whether the market believes that a company choosing to incur the cost
of a celebrity endorsement contract can expect to derive a profit from that
investment.92 By evaluating 110 celebrity endorsement contract announcements,
researchers found that the announcements resulted in positive excess returns on the
82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85 See Jagdish Agrawal & Wagner A. Kamakura, The Economic Worth of Celebrity
Endorsers: An Event Study Analysis, 59 J. MKTG. 56, 60 (1995).
86

Id. at 56.

87

Id.

88

Id.

89

Id. at 57.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.
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company’s market value.93 The mean abnormal return following the announcement
of the celebrity endorsement contract was found to be 0.44%, which was statistically
significant at t=2.39, p<.05.94
The study went on to cite several normative issues with the use of celebrity
endorsements causing some businesses to shy away from the time-tested advertising
practice.95 The normative issues included the rising costs in celebrity endorsements,
the potential for the celebrity to endorse several competing brands
contemporaneously, and the potential for scandal or negative publicity associated
with the celebrity endorser.96 Businesses, though faced with these issues, continue to
use celebrity endorsements. CGI technology can ameliorate many of these
drawbacks, as costs of CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers are far less expensive,
and there is virtually no possibility a deceased celebrity will invite new scandal.
The use of celebrity endorsements increases the likelihood that a consumer will
purchase the advertised product.97 Therefore, it is beyond mere conjecture to suggest
that the practice of digitally resurrecting celebrities for commercial practices will
only continue to be more prevalent. If live celebrity endorsers are profitable to
companies despite the aforementioned risks, then companies will exploit CGIs of
deceased celebrity endorsers to exacerbate their profits and minimize potential risks
in this lucrative advertising scheme.
B. Statement as to the Manner and Context in which such Acts or Practices are
Unfair or Deceptive
In addition to sparking conversation about the prevalence of celebrity
endorsements, the use of celebrity endorsements has spurred academics to determine
how consumer’s dispositions and purchasing choices are influenced by the use of
celebrity endorsements.98 Overall, the research suggests that consumers’ purchasing
decisions are impacted by the endorser’s physical attractiveness, credibility, or
cultural values.99
A 1985 study, grounded in social adaptation theory, found that the physical
attractiveness of the celebrity endorser affected consumers’ attitudes and purchasing

93

Id. at 57-58.

94

Id. at 58.

95 Id. at 60 (“However, the widespread and persistent use of celebrities in advertising
suggests that marketing managers continue to believe that celebrity endorsements are a
worthwhile component of that advertising strategy, despite the costs involved. Our results
suggest that this belief is generally shared by investors as well.”) (discussing despite
normative issues, celebrity endorsement advertising schemes continue to be deployed by
companies).
96

Id.

97 See generally O’Mahony & Meenaghan, supra note 15; Kahle & Homer, infra note 99;
Heath et. al, supra note 76.
98

See generally O’Mahony & Meenaghan, supra note 15; Kahle & Homer, infra note 99;
Heath et. al, supra note 76.
99 Lynn R. Kahle & Pamela Homer, Physical Attractiveness of the Celebrity Endorser: A
Social Adaptation Perspective, 11 J. CONSUMER RES. 954, 955 (1985).
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decisions.100 Social adaptation theory suggests that the adaptive significance of
information will determine its influence. 101 Therefore, information will remain
valuable only so long as it effectuates adaptation.102 Advertisements have only
fleeting adaptation value, so the information that a consumer absorbs before moving
onto the next information source may be the name of the product and the image of
the celebrity endorser.103 Alternatively, the attractive celebrity endorser may cause
the consumer to become more involved with the advertisement as a high
involvement condition as to adaptation of sexuality. 104 The study was based on Petty,
Cacioppo, and Shuman’s 1983 elaboration theory, which found that in conditions of
low involvement—where the consumer is not diligently considering information
regarding the merits of the service or product—celebrities as opposed to arguments
influenced consumer positions.105 However, Petty, Cacioppo, and Shuman did not
give effect to celebrity status or physical attractiveness. The results of the instant
study found an effect for celebrity attractiveness when controlling for celebrity
recognition and celebrity likeability, as consumers were more likely to purchase a
product based on an advertisement featuring an attractive celebrity endorser as
opposed to an unattractive one.106 Beyond purchase intentions, participants in the
study evidenced higher levels of brand and argument recall with attractive celebrity
endorsers.107 This study also coalesces with transfer theory and the matchup
hypothesis.108 The matchup hypothesis and social adaptation theory congregate in
that information will not be adaptive and, therefore, not valuable if the information is
divorced from the advertised product it purports to recommend. 109 Under a matchup
hypothesis, there should be a convergence between the image of the celebrity and the
message of the product. 110 For example, an advertisement featuring iconic singer100 Id. at 960 (“This study showed that the involvement effect previously demonstrated for
advertisements of disposable razors may be quite sensitive to variation. This phenomenon
disappeared in this study and was replaced by an effect for physical attractiveness. These
results more closely approximate the hypotheses of social adaptation theory and the matchup
hypotheses.”).
101

Id. at 954.

102

Id.

103

Id. at 954.

104

Id.

105

Id. at 959 (“Physical attractiveness may affect attitude change at several different
places in the attitude-change process. Sometimes an attractive model may lure readers into an
advertisement in effect increasing the ad’s involvement by transforming it into a source of
information about that adaptive topic, sexuality.”).
106

Id. at 954.

107

Id. at 957 ((“Participants who saw an endorsement by an attractive celebrity liked the
Edge product more (M = 14.02) than participants who saw an unattractive source (M =
12.16)”); see also id. (“Participants were more likely to intend to purchase after exposure to an
attractive (M=1.68) than unattractive (M=1.38) celebrity”).
108

See infra text accompanying notes 117-24 (discussing transfer theory).

109

Kahle & Homer, supra note 99, at 959.

110

John R. Rossiter & Larry Percy, Attitude Change Through Visual Imagery in
Advertising, 9 J. ADVERTISING 10, 10-11 (1980).
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songwriter Bob Dylan would demonstrate a greater attitudinal change in consumers
if the advertised product was an Apple iPod as opposed to a Victoria’s Secret
product.111 Also, CGIs can create images of a deceased celebrity that are flawless,
thereby raising the attractiveness of the celebrity and further altering consumer
involvement conditions. To erase such human flaw from a living celebrity endorser
is as costly an endeavor as creating a CGI endorser, but with the added drawback of
the excessive endorsement contract.112
Conversely, a 1989 study analyzed the impact of celebrity endorsements on
advertising efficacy and credibility as opposed to attractiveness and likeability. 113
The study concluded that consumers find celebrity endorsements function to make
advertisements more believable, especially when the advertisement utilizes a twosided framework—meaning that the celebrity endorser makes both positive and
negative statements regarding the advertised product.114
The two-sided framework is predicated on the theory that light criticism of the
product by the celebrity endorser functions to increase the celebrity’s credibility as
to statements made regarding the positive attributes of the product, thereby raising
the overall efficacy of the ad.115 Celebrities influence consumers through the process
of social influence that can be broken down into three sub-stages, the last two of
which can occur concurrently: compliance, identification, and internalization. 116
Whereas likability has been linked to identification, credibility is linked to
internalization.117 That selfsame study also found that celebrities create a positive
attitude within the consumer toward the brand.118 Consumers may find that the
celebrity endorsement makes the representations more credible because the message
is not coming directly from the company, but from people who choose whether or
not to associate their names with the company’s product. 119 The process by which
111 Bob Dylan has been featured in advertisements for both Apple and Victoria’s Secret. A
possible explanation for the polemic response to the Victoria’s Secret campaign is the
disjointed nature of the endorser and the product under a matchup hypothesis. See Seth
Stevenson, Tangled Up in Boobs: What’s Bob Dylan Doing in a Victoria’s Secret Ad, SLATE
MAG., Apr. 12, 2004 (“Even if Victoria’s Secret hopes to bring in more [baby] boomer
women, do these women want their underwear to exude the essence and spirit of Bob
Dylan?”).
112

Josh Dickey, Everyone is Altered: The Secret Hollywood Procedure that has Fooled Us
for Years, MASHABLE (Dec. 1, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/12/01/Hollywood-secretbeauty-procedure/#8tMaDIOymkqs.
113 See generally Michael A. Kamins et al., Two-Sided Versus One-Sided Celebrity
Endorsements: The Impact on Advertising Effectiveness and Credibility, 18 J. ADVERT. 4
(1989).
114

Id. at 8-9.

115

Id. at 4.

116

Id. at 5, 6 (discussing Herbert C. Kelman, Process of Opinion Change, 25 PUB.
OPINION Q. 57, 57-58 (1961)).
117

Id. at 6.

118

Id.

119

16 C.F.R. § 255.0(e) (2009) (“Accordingly, they may well believe the driver would not
speak for an automotive product unless he actually believed in what he was saying and had
personal knowledge sufficient to form that belief. Hence, they would think that the advertising
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consumers infer the endorser’s motive for participating in the advertising campaign
is often a subconscious, attribution process.120 Companies intend for consumers to
believe the celebrity’s decision to appear in the advertisement is driven not only by
potential profit, but also in a good faith belief in the value of the product. 121 In this
way, CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers made by dead celebrities deceive
consumers, especially if the consumer does not know they are being advertised to by
an “eerily life-like” CGI.122 Digitally resurrected CGI endorsers lack discretion as to
whether or not to appear in the advertisement and lend their credibility to the
product. Therefore, the extent to which consumers believe such discretion exists
constitutes consumer deception.
Another 1989 study rejected the celebrity credibility and celebrity attractiveness
models and focused on the cultural value of the celebrity endorser as most indicative
of their endorsement efficacy.123 Many celebrities embody cultural ideals such as
“strength,” “beauty,” or “grace.”124 Celebrities are able to evoke meaning transfer in
a way that models or anonymous actors cannot, as celebrities’ cultural identities
were fashioned in the public crucible.125 This cultural self-construction transforms
message reflects the driver’s personal views. This attribution of the underlying views to the
driver brings the advertisement within the definition of an endorsement for purposes of this
part.”).
120

Valerie S. Folkes, Recent Attribution Research in Consumer Behavior: A Review and
New Directions, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 548, 549 (1988).
121 Michael A. Kamins & Henry Assael, Two-Sided Versus One-Sided Appeals: A
Cognitive Perspective on Argumentation, Source Derogation, and the Effect of Disconfirming
Trial on Belief Change, 24 J. MKTG. RES. 29, 31 (1987).
122

Blum, supra note 3.

123

Some argue that the source attractiveness and source credibility models are insufficient
to gain a full understanding of the efficacy of the celebrity endorsement advertising strategy:
A new perspective on the process of celebrity endorsement has been developed. It has
suggested that the source models with which endorsement is now understood by
practitioner and scholar are insufficient. The chief deficit of these models is that they
ask us to accept that it is the attractiveness and credibility of the celebrity that make
the endorsement work. Useful for certain purposes, this approach prevents us from
seeing that celebrities are in fact highly individualized and complex bundles of
cultural meaning.
Grant McCracken, Who is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural Foundations of the
Endorsement Process, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 310, 319-20 (1989).
124

See, e.g., Mike McGee, How We Resurrected Audrey HepburnTM for the Galaxy
Chocolate Ad, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/medianetwork/media-network-blog/2014/oct/08/how-we-made-audrey-hepburn-galaxy-ad
(“We
couldn’t take the easy option of filming a lookalike and disguising mismatched nuances
through shadows and camera angles because, first, Audrey was the absolute star of the show
and there was no hiding her in a dark corner; second, as the ultimate symbol of beauty, the
likelihood of casting a near-perfect match was nil. So we went the whole hog and digitally
recreated every millimeter of her face.”).
125 McCracken, supra note 123, at 315 (“Audrey Hepburn delivers ‘elegance’ much more
vividly than even the most elegant model. She does so because she has enacted and absorbed
this elegance by performing it on stage and screen.”).
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celebrities into archetypes for consumers to emulate in their own self-construction
process.126 The meaning transfer perspective hypothesizes that the cultural or
symbolic meaning of the celebrity endorser is transferred to the product, and from
the product to the consumer, so that the endorsements function to create a unique
personality for the brand by assuming the personality of the celebrity.127 The
meaning transfer is complete once the consumer is able identify the cultural value
being represented and understand how that value also exists in the product. 128 Thus,
the meaning transfer is best completed under matchup hypothesis conditions.129
Through celebrity endorsement advertising, companies appropriate these cultural
ideals and transpose them onto their product or service. 130 The use of CGIs of
deceased celebrity endorsers pervert that process, thereby misleading consumers
who rely on advertisements when making purchasing decisions. 131
C. Statement as to the Economic Effect of the Rule, Taking into Account the Effect on
Small Business and Consumers
The FTC has long been conscious of its effect on small businesses and has
emphasized the critical role small businesses have in national strength and the
national economy.132 It is, therefore, necessary to safeguard the contributions of
small businesses vis-à-vis national conglomerates by eliminating the unfair
competition that is deceased celebrity endorser advertising. The FTC has addressed
the needs of small businesses by undertaking small business compliance assistance
pursuant to the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.133

126

Id. at 317.

127

Id. at 310.

128

Id. at 314.

129

Id. at 316; see generally Rossiter & Percy, supra note 112, at 10-16.

130

McCracken, supra note 125, at 310.

131

CGIs can pervert this cultural transfer by imputing the celebrity with cultural
characteristics, such as dialects and language that they may not have had at their
disposal during their lifetime:
My father did not drink, that’s true . . . [he] did not have a problem with people who
drink occasionally . . . He was never knocking drinks out of people’s hands if there
were having an enjoyable time . . . [T]his commercial was for China and we thought
the point was to get his philosophy out . . . to a large number of people, in a way that
would hopefully capture their attention and make them think.’ . . . The commercial
aired in Honk Kong will be in Cantonese. ‘No he did not speak Mandarin [in reality].
But [the ad] was for China.
See, e.g., Vivienne Chow, It’s a Tribute, Not an Ad, Says Bruce Lee’s Daughter, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 12, 2013.
132 See, e.g., Comm’r James M. Mead, Address at the Annual Meeting of the National
Electronic Distributors Association (Sept. 10, 1951) (transcript available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/684191/19510910_mead_the_
ftc_and_small_business.pdf) [hereinafter Mead Address].
133 Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 601; Small
Business
Regulatory
Enforcement
Fairness
Act,
FTC
(Jul.
8,
1998),
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In 1976, Congress established the Office of Advocacy within the Small Business
Administration (“SBA”) to ensure that small businesses had a voice in the rulemaking process.134 The U.S. SBA concedes that “not all regulations fall more heavily
on small firms than on their larger counterparts.” 135 This is almost certainly the case
here, as small businesses would be relatively unaffected by this rule as the FTC
focuses its rules on national advertisements and leaves local ads largely to state and
local government.136 It is the large companies that make most use of celebrity
endorsements and are, therefore, impacted by potential CGI regulation. 137 To allow
large businesses to use this deceptive trade practice would result in unfair
competition to small businesses.
As the event analysis study found, the traditional use of celebrity endorsements
remains profitable.138 If CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers were prohibited,
companies would be “constrained” to using a lucrative method of advertising that is
not unfair or deceptive to consumers or competitors. Though it is possible that
companies will pass the added cost of regulation (i.e., having to pay for living
celebrities) onto consumers, advertising, as a practice, generally functions to drive
costs down by encouraging fair competition. 139 Further, any costs will be shared
widely across consumers.140
Unlike healthcare, tax, and environmental compliance, it is unlikely that
regulation of CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers will have a disproportionate
impact on small business.141 In fact, this regulation will likely function to bring about
equity in business competition.
The federal Regulatory Right-to-Know Act requires the Office of Management
and Budget (“OMB”) to submit, to the extent feasible, estimates of the total annual
costs and benefits of federal rules.142 Such publication of cost-benefit analyses allows
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1998/07/small-business-regulatoryenforcement-fairness-act-1996-sbrefa.
134 Office of Advocacy, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/advocacy (last
visited Mar. 12, 2017) (“Advocacy is an independent voice for small business within the
federal government, the watchdog for the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) and the source of
small business statistics. Advocacy advances the views and concerns of small business before
Congress, the White House, the federal agencies, the federal courts and state policy makers.”).
135

Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, The Impact of Regulatory Costs on Small Firms,
U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. 58 (2010) (“Moreover, not all regulations fall more heavily on small
firms than on their larger counterparts.”).
136

Advertising FAQ’s: A Guide for Small Business, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/business-center/guidance/advertising-faqs-guide-small-business (last visited Feb. 9,
2016).
137

See, e.g., McGee, supra note 124.

138

Agrawal & Kamakura, supra note 85.

139

See infra notes 149-64 and accompanying text (discussing economic effects of
proposed regulation).
140

See infra notes 165-69 (regarding consumers being a disparate group).

141

Crain & Crain, supra note 135.

142

Treasure and General Government Appropriations Act of 2001, 31 U.S.C.S. § 1105.
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for greater transparency into the regulatory state so as to identify any disparate effect
on small business.143 OMB’s cost-benefit analysis includes only regulations from the
previous ten years that are anticipated to have an annual economic impact of at least
$100 million.144 However, the FTC is outside this reporting process as an
independent agency, as Executive Order 12866 applies to executive agencies only. 145
While the FTC is outside this formal process, conducting cost-benefit analyses of
potential regulation lends further justification for regulation beyond rhetoric and
could be used to evidence that the rule satisfies an arbitrary and capricious standard
should it be subjected to judicial review.
V. FTC REGULATION: FINAL REGULATORY ANALYSIS
Similar to the Proposed Statement of Basis and Purpose, the FTC is required to
analyze each factor mentioned in Section III when promulgating its final rule. 146
However, only some of the factors will be dispositive of the Commission’s decision
to regulate CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers. The most salient of the factors are:
(1) the analysis of projected benefits and any adverse economic effects and other
effects of the rule, (2) an explanation of the reasons for the determination of the
commission that the final rule will attain its objectives in a manner consistent with
applicable law and the reasons the particular alternative was chosen, and (3) the
summary of any significant issues raised by the comments submitted during the
public comment in response to the preliminary regulatory analysis.
A. Analysis of Projected Benefits and Any Adverse Economic Effects and Any Other
Effects of the Rule
The primary projected benefits include the protection of the consumer right to be
informed and the protection of fair market competition. 147 As described in Section III
of this Note, CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsrs pervert the consumer heuristic
process.148
One potential economic effect would be the effect on the national labor market.
The dialogue over economic effects of regulation on the national labor market has
grown steadily more contentious as the levels of unemployment remain high
following the Great Recession.149

143

Id.

144

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. § 51,735 (1993).

145

Id.

146

16 C.F.R. § 1.14 (2017).

147

Presidential Papers, John F. Kennedy, Special Message to Congress on Protecting the
Consumer Interest, Mar. 15, 1962 (“These rights include: . . . The right to be informed—to be
protected against fraudulent, deceitful, or grossly misleading information, advertising,
labeling, or other practices, and to be given the facts he needs to make an informed choice . . .
to promote the fuller realization of these consumer rights, it is necessary that existing
Government programs be strengthened, that Government organization be improved, and, in
certain areas, that new legislation be enacted”).
148

See supra Section III.

149 Josh Bivens, Macroeconomic Effects of Regulatory Changes in Economies with Large
Output Gaps 1 (Econ. Policy Inst., Working Paper No. 292, 2012); U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
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Without regulation of CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers, the input costs for
advertisers would shrink, thereby enlarging the output gap. The “output gap” is the
actual gross domestic product less the potential gross domestic product divided by
the potential gross domestic product.150 Therefore, the output gap reflects the
difference between what the economy is producing and what the economy could
produce, meaning that a large output gap results in an underperforming labor market
and a poor national economy.151 With a negative output gap, the economy features a
productive slack, such that the demand for products or services is greater than the
supply.152 The macroeconomic implication of a regulation that creates a negative
shock of productivity will lower unemployment, as the existing demand can only be
met with increased input.153 In this way, a regulation that imposes costs on
businesses can function to shrink the output gap and lower the unemployment rate. 154
So, for example, if a company wished to reap the benefits of a celebrity endorser and
was unable to deploy deceptive CGI technology (pursuant to this proposed
regulation), the company would be required to make an investment in the form of a
celebrity endorsement contract, thereby raising its input costs and creating a negative
productivity shock, which could only be remedied by increased input of labor
shrinking the output gap. And, as demonstrated above, that which increases demand
will shrink the output gap, resulting in greater employment so that consumers would
be able to meet increased prices through newly acquired disposable income. 155
Another potential economic effect would concern potential rises in the price of
goods pursuant to regulation. A rise in prices could result from regulation; however,
if significant, the price rise could precipitate a response from the Federal Reserve
that would increase interest rates, leading to a reduction in demand of such now
unduly costly products.156 Such a Federal Reserve response is unlikely due to
persistent large output gaps following the Great Recession.157 A study conducted by
agents of the Federal Reserve found that regulations that function to reduce supply,
because the industry has to bear additional costs, would increase the demand if the
regulation leads to an rise in the overall price of the product.158 The study points to a
potential flaw in standard theoretical macroeconomics and posits that consumers
consume based on current income as opposed to predictions of expected future
income due to liquidity constraints. 159 An increase in price levels decreases the real
STATISTICS, BLS SPOTLIGHT ON STATISTICS: THE RECESSION OF 2007-2009 7 (2012),
http://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/pdf/recession_bls_spotlight.pdf.
150

Id. at 2.

151

Id. at 4.

152

Id.

153

Id.

154

Id.

155

Id.

156

Gauti Eggertsson & Paul Krugman, Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A
Fisher-Minsky-Koo Approach, Q.J. ECON. 1469, 1480 (2012).
157

Bivens, supra note 149, at 6.

158

Id. at 6-8.

159

Eggertsson & Krugman, supra note 156, at 1506.
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burden of debt, which incentivizes consumers to purchase out of debt rather than out
of wealth.160 Conversely, falling prices lead to an increase in the “Fisher Effect,”
meaning that the real value of debt is raised—which leads to deflation and less
spending out of debt.161 Therefore, should this regulation lead to rising prices of the
advertised goods, the Fisher Effect will actually raise demand for products by
effectuating a kind of redistribution of purchasing power. 162
B. An Explanation of the Reasons for the Determination of the Commission that the
Final Rule Will Attain Its Objectives in a Manner Consistent with Applicable Law
and the Reasons the Particular Alternative was Chosen
Consumers need Commission intervention because—as a group—they are so
disparate and disorganized that their interests are unlikely to be independently
protected, whereas organized groups like advertisers will be protected through
legislators under public choice theory. 163 Governmental intervention into the market
dates back to 50 B.C. and has continued to modernity. 164 President Kennedy
addressed Congress in 1962, outlining the need for government action to meet its
duty to protect consumers by stating the four rights of consumers. 165 In the absence
of CGI regulation, consumers will be left without the second right: —the right to be
informed.166 The Commission understands that its industry regulation has a real
impact on consumers. In fact, “[a]s the only federal agency with both consumer
protection and competition jurisdiction in broad sectors of the economy, the FTC’s
work touches the economic life of every American.” 167 Therefore, the Commission
must ensure that its rules meet this objective of protecting consumers in a manner

160

Id. at 1482.

161

Id. at 1484.

162

Id. at 1484-85.

163 Cuevas, supra note 45, at 448 (“Public choice theory posits that legislation is not
enacted to further the public good, but rather, to further the ends of a particular interest group.
Under public choice theory, legislators are primarily concerned with getting reelected. Interest
groups that make significant campaign contributions wield a disproportionate amount of
power in the legislature, and it is these groups that are able to have legislation passed that
furthers their economic interest.”) (footnotes omitted).
164 DIG. 48.12.2pr. (Ulpianus, De Officio Proconsulis 9) (“Lege iulia de annona poena
statuitur adversus eum, qui contra annonam fecerit societatemve coierit, quo annona carior
fiat.”); 3 PATRICK MAC CHOMBAICH DE COLQUHOUN, A SUMMARY OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW:
ILLUSTRATED BY COMMENTARIES ON AND PARALLELS FROM THE MOSAIC, CANON,
MOHAMMEDAN, ENGLISH, AND FOREIGN LAW 653 § 2409 (1854) (“The Lex Julia de annona
was directed at those who kept up the price of corn by artificial means.”).
165

Presidential Papers, supra note 147, at 236.

166

Id.

167 Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on the FTC’s Regulatory Reform
Program: Twenty Years of Systematic Retrospective Rule Reviews & New Prospective
Initiatives to Increase Public Participation and Reduce Burdens on Business: Hearing on
Agency Views on Regulatory Overhaul Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement
of Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n).
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consistent with its congressional mandate to protect against unfair or deceptive acts
or practices.
In its broadest sense, the Commission’s objective is to protect consumers and
businesses by ensuring fair market competition. 168 In its actions, the Commission
must neither affirm advertising practices that are obnoxious to the rule of law nor
promulgate regulation that is inconsistent with its delegated authority or contrary to
the public interest.169 The applicable laws are the statutory authority granted to the
FTC in the FTC Act170 and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).171 In order to
ensure that the FTC’s final rules are consistent with both applicable law and modern
technological advances, the FTC engages in periodic reviews of its rules and
industry guides. “[W]e [the FTC] systematically and rigorously have reviewed our
rules to ensure that they enhance consumer welfare without imposing undue burdens
on business.”172 For the reasons outlined in Section III of this note, a rule
determining that the use of CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers for the purposes of
celebrity endorsements is deceptive would be consistent with the applicable law and
Commission objectives.
C. Summary of Any Significant Issues Predicted to be Raised by the Comments
Submitted During the Public Comment Period in Response to the Preliminary
Regulatory Analysis
The rules regarding celebrity endorsements were changed with the revision of the
industry guides in 2009.173 The issues raised by the commentators during that period
are anticipated to be substantially similar to that which the Commission can expect
in 2020.
The American Association of Advertising Agencies (“AAAA”) and the
American Advertising Federation (“AAF”) found the 1980 industry guides sufficient
and therefore opposed the 2009 revisions. 174 The crux of the AAAA’s and AAF’s
168 FED. TRADE COMM’N, No. P064502, FTC TESTIFIES ABOUT EFFORTS TO COMBAT
FRAUDULENT AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING 2 (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2009/07/ftc-testifies-about-efforts-combat-fraudulent-deceptive (“The Federal Trade
Commission works for consumers to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair business
practices and to provide information to help spot, stop, and avoid them.”).
169

James Mead, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Annual Meeting of the
National Electronic Distributors Association: The Federal Trade Commission and Small
Business
5
(Sept.
10,
1951),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/684191/19510910_mead_the_
ftc_and_small_business.pdf.
170

15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2017).

171

5 U.S.C. § 553 (2017).

172

Hearing, supra note 167, at 1.

173

16 C.F.R. § 255.0(a) (2009).

174

American Association of Advertising Agencies and American Advertising Federation,
Comment Letter on Proposed Changes to the FTC Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements
and
Testimonials
in
Advertising
2
(June
18,
2007),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/guides-concerning-useendorsements-and-testimonials-advertising-539124-00008/539124-00008.pdf (“Finding the
current Guides effective in ensuring the truth and accuracy of endorsements and testimonials,
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joint argument was that there was insufficient evidence to show that testimonials and
endorsements were actually deceiving consumers. 175 However, this assertion is a
failing argument, as there need not be a showing of actual deception in order for the
FTC to promulgate regulation.176 Rather, the advertisement need only have the
capacity to deceive.177 Further, as the studies above indicate, there is tremendous
potential for actual deception with CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers. 178
One of the main arguments the advertising industry raised in its resistance to
regulation was the prominence of industry self-regulation.179 Self-regulation is
voluntary action undertaken by the collective industry to control its collective action
as opposed to, or in conjunction with, government regulation.180 The AAAA and the
AAF bill the National Advertising Division (“NAD”) of the Council of Better
Business Bureaus (“CBBB”) and the National Advertising Review Board (“NARB”)
as sufficient deterrents to advertisers from using deceptive consumer testimonials.181
The Commission does not dismiss the value of self-regulation.182 The advertising
the AAAA and the AAF strongly urged the Commission to not adopt any changes to the
Guides.”) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Comment Letter].
175 Id. at 3 (“While we appreciate the Commission’s desire to protect consumers from
deceptive advertising, there is little evidence that consumers are deceived by testimonials or
endorsements, whether in traditional media or new media.”).
176 Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944) (“That the
Commission did not produce consumers to testify to their deception does not make the order
improper, since actual deception of the public need not be shown. . . . Representations merely
having a ‘capacity to deceive’ are unlawful.”) (quoting FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S.
67, 81 (1934)) (citations omitted).
177

Id.; see, e.g., Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979)
(“Proof of actual deception is unnecessary to establish a violation of Section 5.
Misrepresentations are condemned if they possess a tendency to deceive.”); Simeon Mgmt.
Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 (9th Cir. 1978) (“This court has previously stated that
advertisements ‘capable of being interpreted in a misleading way should be construed against
the advertiser.’”) (quoting Resort Car Rental System, Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir.
1975)); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976) (“Moreover, the FTC has
been sustained in finding that advertising is misleading even absent evidence of that actual
effect on customers; the likelihood or propensity of deception is the criterion by which
advertising is measured.”) (footnote omitted).
178 See, e.g., Agrawal & Kamakura, supra note 85, at 56; Heath et al., supra note 76, at
520; Kahle & Homer, supra note 99, at 955; McCracken, supra note 123, at 312; O’Mahony
& Meenaghan, supra note 15, at 15.
179 Comment Letter, supra note 174, at 10 (“[S]elf regulatory framework, which
effectively ensures against deception without overly burdening advertisers. . . . Private
litigants also continue to challenge unsubstantiated testimonials through Lanham Act
litigations. Industry self-regulation via the National Advertising Division (‘NAD’) of the
Council of Better Business Bureaus (‘CBBB’), and the National Advertising Review Board
(‘NARB’) provides another deterrent. . . .”).
180 Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-Regulation Without Sanctions: The
Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 698, 698 (2000).
181

Comment Letter, supra note 174, at 10.

182 FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PERSPECTIVES ON
MARKETING, SELF-REGULATION & CHILDHOOD OBESITY: A REPORT ON A JOINT WORKSHOP OF
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organizations posit that unless and until self-regulation becomes ineffective, the FTC
should not make any substantive changes to the industry guides.183 However, the
scholarship is rife with evidence that industries’ self-regulation, while helpful, is not
the deterrent it touts to be.184 To date, there has been no industry self-regulation of
CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers.
VI. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTED EXAMPLE TO BE INCORPORATED IN THE 2020
GUIDE CONCERNING THE USE OF ENDORSEMENTS AND TESTIMONIALS IN
ADVERTISING
Celebrity endorsements are a profitable form of advertising and impact
consumers’ choices.185 CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers ameliorate cost issues
and concerns, such as potential for scandal of traditional celebrity endorsers.
However, the advertising industry has already begun to exploit the advantages of
deceased celebrity endorsers through CGI technology. Furthermore, as the U.S.
population ages, advertisers may find that these classic, albeit deceased, celebrities
are more appealing to aging populations than modern celebrities and socialites. 186
CGIs of deceased celebrity endorsers are misleading and pervert the consumer’s
purchasing decision. Therefore, in order to fulfill its congressionally mandated duty
to protect consumers, the Commission must subject CGIs of deceased celebrity
endorsers to regulation.187 Beyond protecting consumers and businesses by ensuring
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION & THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 39
(2006), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/perspectives-marketing-selfregulation-childhood-obesity-report-joint-workshop-federaltrade/perspectivesonmarketingselfregulationchildhoodobesityftcandhhsreportonjointworkshop.pdf (“Effective industry selfregulation can have significant benefits, and can, in many instances, address problems more
quickly, creatively, and flexibly than government regulation. For self-regulation to be
effective, however, it should clearly address the problems it seeks to remedy, adjust to new
developments within the industry, be enforced and widely followed by affected industry
members, and be visible and accessible to the public.”) (footnote omitted).
THE

183 Comment Letter, supra note 174, at 18 (“Premature changes to the Guides regarding
new media are unnecessary at this time as industry self-regulation appears to be effective in
prompting appropriate disclosures.”).
184 See, e.g., Mary J. Culnan, Protecting Privacy Online: Is Self-Regulation Working?, 19
J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 20, 20-26 (2000); King & Lenox, supra note 180, at 698; Angela
J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 713-14 (1999); Daniel
Castro, Benefits and Limitations of Industry Self-Regulation for Online Behavior Advertising,
INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 1 (Dec. 13, 2011), http://itif.org/files/2011-self-regulationonline-behavioral-advertising.pdf.
185 See, e.g., Agrawal & Kamakura, supra note 85, at 56; Heath et al., supra note 76, at
520; Kahle & Homer, supra note 99, at 954; McCracken, supra note 123, at 318; O’Mahony
& Meenaghan, supra note 15, at 15.
186

Mitra Toossi, Labor Force Projections to 2020: A More Slowly Growing Workforce,
135 U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. MONTHLY LAB. REV. 43, 45 (2012) (“A significant factor
shaping the future demographics of the U.S. population is the increase in older population
cohorts. In 2020, the 55-years-and-older age group will total 97.8 million, composing 28.7
percent of the 2020 resident population, compared with 24.7 percent in 2010.”).
187

Mead Address, supra note 132, at 4.
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fair market competition, FTC regulation of CGI deceased celebrity endorsers would
protect advertising companies from potential penalties incurred from running such a
deceptive advertisement.188 For the above reasons, the FTC, having the ability to
regulate this practice, should issue an all-out ban on CGIs of deceased celebrity
endorsers.
Example 1: A liquor company contracts out to a graphic design company to create a
computer-generated image to digitally reanimate a celebrity. The computergenerated image is used in an advertisement for the liquor company. Many
consumers will recognize this celebrity and not simply in their capacity as an
endorser. The celebrity endorser lends their likeness and credibility to the product, as
consumers will believe that the celebrity would not endorse the product unless he or
she actually uses the product. The use of the celebrity will increase the likelihood the
consumer will purchase the product. Verbal statements by the celebrity or celebrity
interaction with the product would constitute celebrity endorsement. The use of a
computer-generated image of a celebrity is a false advertisement as the celebrity is
not a bona-fide user of the product at the time of the endorsement. The CGI celebrity
endorsement is a false advertisement that constitutes a deceptive trade practice
prohibited by law.

188 Id. Such penalties can include: (1) civil penalties which could result in penalties
ranging from thousands of dollars to millions of dollars, (2) cease and desist orders, the
violation of which can result in a $16,000 per day fine, or (3) corrective advertising. Id.
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